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For many years economists have theorized about 
the options for stimulating the economy with 
monetary policy when policy rates are pushed  
as low as they can go. Until recently this was little 
more than a hypothetical exercise in the United 
States, spurred in part by Japan’s encounter  
with the so-called “zero lower bound” on interest 
rates in the 1990s. The question also bore some 
operational importance. “The greater the confi-
dence of central bankers that tools exist to help 
the economy escape the zero bound, the less 
need there is to maintain an inflation ‘buffer,’  
bolstering the argument for a lower inflation  
objective,” wrote Federal Reserve chairman Ben 
Bernanke, then a governor, with economists 
Vincent Reinhart and Brian Sack in 2004.1 
Today the Federal Reserve is itself facing the  
zero bound on interest rates, as are many  
central banks globally. Since December 2008,  
the Fed’s primary policy interest rate, the target 
federal funds rate, has been set at a range of  
between zero and 0.25 percent. Nonetheless,  
the economy has remained weak. Several Fed 
policymakers have expressed that if it were  
possible to push the federal funds rate lower,  
they would currently support doing so to stimu-
late the economy.
What options do policymakers have when further 
accommodation is desired but policy interest 
rates cannot be cut any further? One option is 
to take steps to influence interest rates in the 
economy through nontraditional avenues. Under 
normal circumstances (i.e., when interest rates 
are not at the zero bound) the Fed stimulates 
the economy by purchasing Treasury securities 
through open market operations. This increases 
the quantity of reserves in the banking system 
and puts direct downward pressure on the fed-
eral funds rate, the market-determined rate at 
which banks lend to each other on an overnight 
basis. As banks’ borrowing costs are bid down,  
so are other lending rates in the economy.
Through a similar mechanism, the Fed can also 
put downward pressure on market interest rates 
by purchasing large quantities of assets from the 
private sector. This is often referred to as “quan-
titative easing” or “large-scale asset purchases” 
(LSAPs).2 The Fed has launched LSAPs programs  
on two separate occasions in recent history.  
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Over the past two years the Federal Reserve has engaged in large-scale asset 
purchases (LSAPs), often grouped under the heading of “quantitative easing,” 
as an alternative means of stimulating the economy when policy rates are  
at their zero lower bound. Theoretical and empirical research shows how this 
policy may lower long-term interest rates, and financial market data suggest 
that the initial launch of LSAPs had an effect on expectations about future  
Fed policy.
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From November 2008 to March 2010 the Fed pur-
chased $1.75 trillion in long-term treasuries and 
both debt and fixed rate mortgage-backed securities 
issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In November 
2010 the Fed announced that it would purchase an 
additional $600 billion in long-term treasuries by the 
middle of 2011, or about $75 billion each month.
Before the recent financial crisis, open market op-
erations were designed to not have a large effect 
on Treasury prices; such purchases used to be small 
relative to the total markets of the securities involved. 
In contrast, LSAPs are designed specifically to be 
large enough to have an effect on Treasury prices 
and yields. The first round of LSAPs represented 22 
percent of the $7.7 trillion stock of those assets out-
standing at the beginning of the program, estimate 
New York Fed researchers Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, 
and Sack (2010).3 They suggest that no investor, pub-
lic or private, has ever made such large purchases in 
such a short period of time.
The Portfolio Rebalance Channel
How precisely do LSAPs affect long-term interest 
rates? The direct effect is to reduce the supply of 
longer-term investments held by the public, replac-
ing that supply with reserves. Investors react by  
rebalancing their portfolios of bonds and other 
investments, though that does not necessarily mean 
that a change in the supply of long-term bonds 
should have a noticeable effect on long-term rates 
since assets of different maturities are to a degree 
substitutable to investors. 
Indeed, early research did not find empirical support 
for the idea that the government’s choice of the  
“maturity structure” of government debt—the pro-
portion of total government debt issued in short-term 
versus long-term bonds—would strongly affect the 
prices and yields on those debt instruments. A study 
by Modigliani and Sutch in 1966 looked at the effect 
of a U.S. Treasury effort to raise short-term rates in 
the early 1960’s through open market purchases  
by the Fed.4 The purpose of this effort was to boost 
the dollar and capital inflows to the United States.  
They found little movement in short-term Treasury 
yields, although later studies noted concurrent  
actions by the Treasury that potentially offset  
the program. 
Studies on subsequent episodes in which the rela-
tive supply of long-versus short-term treasuries was 
affected have found a stronger effect of the maturity 
structure of government debt on interest rates.5 
These results suggest that otherwise similar assets 
of different maturities are imperfect substitutes. If 
different market participants display a strong prefer-
ence for different maturity dates, a reduction in the 
supply of long-term treasuries would turn them into 
a more scarce good, and thus would make them 
trade at a higher price and, equivalently, lower their 
yield. The “preferred habitat” hypothesis was a chan-
nel often cited as a possible explanation for the im-
perfect substitutability between long-term treasuries 
and other assets. This hypothesis was introduced by 
Modigliani and Sutch in 1966, but no formal model 
was provided, which did not allow for progress in 
studying its implications. 
The gap has been partially filled by a 2009 paper by 
Vayanos and Vila.6 They provide the first formal model 
of the preferred habitat view of the term structure of 
interest rates. They model two types of investors: A 
set interested only in assets of a specific maturity, and 
arbitrageurs with no strong preference for any specif-
ic maturity. As a representative example of an inves-
tor with a strong preference for assets with a specific 
maturity, think, for instance, of a 50-year-old worker 
who may prefer saving in treasuries with a maturity 
of 20 years versus investing in shorter-term treasur-
ies and rolling them over upon maturity. The second 
investment strategy implies bearing the risk of inter-
est rate changes. This may make it a riskier strategy if 
the worker assigns a low probability to having to sell 
those long-term treasuries before they mature, or if 
he assigns a low probability to an increase in inflation 
over the next 20 years.
In the setup presented by Vayanos and Vila, there  
is a potential role for LSAPs as long as arbitrageurs, 
who do not have any strong preference for any  
maturity date, are sufficiently risk averse. Another 
reason that has been mentioned for imperfect  
arbitrage is that the agents who could potentially arbitrage away differences in returns between assets 
face leverage constraints. 
But the preferred habitat hypothesis is not the only 
reason why LSAPs may have an effect on long-term 
interest rates. By purchasing long-term treasuries,  
the Fed is also removing duration, or interest rate 
risk, from the bond portfolio of the private sector. 
Interest rate risk is the risk that rates will rise over  
the life of a long-term bond, causing the price of  
the bond to fall and reducing the investor’s return. 
Since the private sector as a whole is less exposed  
to interest rate risk, it will require lower marginal 
compensation for that risk. This would provide  
another source of downward pressure on long- 
term interest rates as a result of LSAPs.
However, this latter point is not complete, as  
pointed out by Minneapolis Fed president Narayana 
Kocherlakota.7 The private sector is less exposed to 
interest rate risk because the public sector, through 
the Fed, has taken on that risk. From this perspective, 
the Fed’s purchases have not eliminated interest rate 
risk faced by the economy, but only shifted it from 
bondholders to taxpayers. Given that private bond-
holders are also public taxpayers, LSAPs to an extent 
simply shift risk from one pocket to the other. To  
assume that the net effect is a boost in macroeco-
nomic activity assumes that these effects do not 
cancel each other out—as would be the case, for 
example, if Ricardian equivalence is violated. (The 
theory of Ricardian equivalence predicts that extra 
tax risk will deter economic activity because taxpay-
ers will save in anticipation of those potential future 
tax increases.)
The Communications Channel 
The LSAPs may also affect long-term interest rates 
through market expectations if they transmit infor-
mation about the likelihood that the Fed will main-
tain the policy rate at a low level for a long period. 
Since the end of 2008, the Fed has included in its 
policy statements an explicit commitment to keeping 
the federal funds rate at a very low level for “an ex-
tended period.” But accompanying such statements 
with an asset purchase program could be interpreted 
as a stronger signal for low future interest rates.  
Since long term rates are a partial function of short 
term rates, long-term rates would tend to decline as 
well. (The LSAPs may also communicate information 
about the Fed’s view of the weakness of the economy, 
which could reinforce weak private forecasts of future 
economic activity and therefore raise the probability 
that investors assign to low future interest rates.)
It is not easy to estimate the effect of a policy action 
on the probability distribution that market partici-
pants assign to possible paths of future short-term 
interest rates because that probability distribution 
is not directly observable. However, one can exam-
ine the prices of assets that are directly affected by 
changes in that probability distribution—namely,  
the prices of futures on federal funds rates.
There is strong evidence that near-term futures 
markets (that is, up to 3 months ahead) are a good 
predictor of the actual federal funds rate.8 However, 
the rates implied by futures contracts with longer  
horizons are poor predictors of the actual rate. 
Among other studies, studies by Piazzesi and  
Swanson (2008)9 and Hamilton and Okimoto (2010)10 
document that there is a non-negligible and time-
varying “risk premium” component in long-horizon 
fed funds futures contracts that causes the rate 
markets expect to differ from the actual rate that 
transpires.11 Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) show how 
introducing risk adjustments to the rates implied by 
futures contracts may deliver better predictions of 
actual federal funds rates.
Thus, one should exercise caution when using futures 
contracts to infer investors’ expectations about future 
federal funds rates. Still, as long as the risk premium 
is not too volatile, changes in the federal funds rate 
implied by futures contracts would be informative 
about movements in the expectations of the future 
path of the federal funds rate. In particular, it could 
be that a relatively slow-moving term such as the 
cyclical variation in risk premia would have a small 
effect on day-to-day changes in futures prices.
We look at the affect of LSAPs on expectations as 
manifested through fed funds futures markets.  
Page 3Figure 1: Implied Federal Funds Rate Day Before and Day of Select Asset Purchase Announcements
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e November 25, 2008 December 1, 2008
Announcements
November 25, 2008: Initial LSAPs announcement of up to $100 billion in 
agency debt and up to $500 billion in agency mortgage-backed securi-
ties (MBS).
December 1, 2008: Speech by Chairman Bernanke that the Fed “could 
purchase longer-term Treasury securities.”
December 16, 2008 and January 28, 2009: FOMC statements that the 
Fed was considering expanding agency purchases and initiating pur-
chases of long-term Treasuries.
March 18, 2009: FOMC statement that the Fed would expand purchases 
up to $300 billion of long-term Treasuries and up to $200 billion and 
$1.25 trillion of agency debt and agency MBS.
Note: Dates displayed here are considered by Gagnon et. al. (2010). Here we include in the implied federal funds rate a correction for term 
premium equal to one basis point per month. The January 28, 2009 change in fed funds futures is opposite of the sign expected; we don’t 
have a full understanding of this at the present time.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors
January 28, 2009 December 16, 2008
March 18, 2009
1 35 37 33 31 29 25 21 27 17 19 15 13 11 9 7 5 3
1 35 37 33 31 29 25 21 27 17 19 15 13 11 9 7 5 3
1 35 37 33 31 29 25 21 27 17 19 15 13 11 9 7 5 3
1 35 37 33 31 29 25 21 27 17 19 15 13 11 9 7 5 3
1 35 37 33 31 29 25 21 27 17 19 15 13 11 9 7 5 3
17-March-2009 18-March-2009
15-December-2008 16-December-2008








The technique we use is somewhat modeled from 
the aforementioned study by Gagnon et. al. (2010).  
They compare the closing value of Treasury and other 
bond yields in the days of relevant announcements 
about asset purchase programs and the closing value 
in the previous day. They consider eight announce-
ment episodes, including the initial announcement 
of LSAPs, speeches on the policy by Fed officials, 
and announcements of changes to the policy. The 
authors find that in those eight days the yield on 
10-year Treasury bonds accumulated a cumulative 
decline of 91 basis points. There were similar declines 
in agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securi-
ties. They also observed declines in yields on assets 
not directly purchased by the Fed, implying that the 
program to a degree achieved its intended effect on 
overall market interest rates.
Figure 1 shows how the implied rates in futures  
contracts changed in the earliest of those eight  
announcements, in which implied rates displayed  
the largest response. The implied rates decreased  
significantly after the first announcements.  
For instance, the magnitudes of the falls in the 
implied rates with horizons of two and three years 
ahead that were observed after the first three an-
nouncements were more than three standard devia-
tions away, compared to the average volatility of the  
daily change in those series since the start of 2008. 
Figure 2 plots the cumulative decline over all eight 
announcements considered by Gagnon et. al.,  
along with that standard deviation. These move-
ments could be caused by a downward revision in 
the path of future federal funds rates expected by 
market participants. But these movements could also 
be caused by changes in risk premia for at least two 
reasons. First, removing duration from the portfolio 
of private agents in a period with low interest rates 
is likely to reduce the hedging demand of holders 
of long-term bonds that are concerned with capital 
losses caused by future increases in federal funds 
rates. That would tend to push the implied rates  
in futures contracts downward. 
Note: The solid line illustrates the cumulative change of implied rates in futures contracts over the eight LSAPs announcement days  
considered in Gagnon et. al. (2010). The dotted and dashed lines were computed based on the standard deviation of daily changes  
since the start of 2008, with the assumption that the movements in the implied rates observed in the announcement days were  
independent across each other.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Goverors.   
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Second, one would expect that policy announce-
ments would reduce uncertainty and, thus, would 
tend to reduce risk premia. Piazzesi and Swanson 
(2008) illustrate that the risk premium embedded in 
fed funds futures contracts is positive and relatively 
high during recessions, which suggests that a de-
crease in uncertainty may decrease the implied rates 
in futures contracts. Teasing out how much of the 
decline in the rates implied by futures contracts may 
be due to lower expectations of future federal funds 
rates or to lower risk premia is hard without a formal 
model that accounts for risk premia. In any case, one 
could conclude that the decline in the rates implied 
by futures contracts offers a measure of the upper 
bound of the effect of LSAP policy announcements 
on expectations of future federal funds rates.
Conclusion
Empirical studies have found an effect of LSAPs on 
long-term interest rates, which could be reconciled 
with different theoretical explanations. However, 
one has to bear in mind that studies of the Fed’s first 
round of LSAPs from late 2008 to early 2010 analyze 
an episode that was implemented at a time of con-
siderable strain in financial markets. Many of those 
strains have receded today, so the magnitude of the 
effects reported in those studies cannot be extrapo-
lated to estimate the expected effects of the current 
ongoing round of LSAPs.
There is some evidence that LSAPs have affected 
expectations about future Fed policy. In particular, 
there seems to be evidence of a downward revision 
in the expected future path of the federal funds rate 
during the first round LSAPs, though the magnitude 
of this effect is hard to decipher because of the likely 
simultaneous changes in risk premia.
Renee Courtois Haltom is a writer and Juan Carlos 
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